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This  paper  was  prepared for  the  conference  "Fact  or  Fiction?  Perspectives  a1 
Realism  and  Economics"  in  honor  of  Uskali  Maki's  inaugural  at  the  Erasmus 
Institute  for  Philosophy  and  Economics,  14-15  November  1997.  It  owes  its 
existence to the conjunction of  several events.  It is largely a reaction to the work 
of Tony  Lawson and Nancy Cartwright, which I have followed with great  interest 
for  many  years.  The  immediate  stimulus  was  the  publication  of  Lawson's 
Economics and Reality  arid the  two  lectures,  "Where Do  Laws  of  Nature  Come 
From?" and "The  Rule of  Physicsrrhe  Rule of  Economics:  Empire or  Alliance?," 
delivered by  Cartwright  on 10  April 1997 in the  University  of  California,  Davis.  I 
had for  some  time  believed  that  Lawson  was  wrong  to  see  econometrics  and 
critical realism were  ~nconipatible.  When  I made  this point to Jochen  Runde at  the 
Vancouver meetings of  the History of Economics  Society  in 1996,  he  urged me  to 
write  my  thoughts  down  on the  grounds  that  "Tony  likes a  good  argument."  I 
thank him  for  his encouragement.  And I thank Uskali  Maki  for  having early  cn 
stimulated my  thinking about realism and, more practically,  for providing the venue 
and the deadline that ensured that this paper would be written. 
Note:  The Working Papers of  the Department of Economics, University of California, 
Davis, are preliminary nqaterials circulated to invite discussion and critical 
comment.  These papers may be freely circulated but to protect their tentative 
character they are not to be quoted without the permission of the author. Abstract 
Starting with a realist ontology the economic methodologist, Tony Lawson, argues that 
econometrics is a failed project.  Apparently more sympathetic to econometrics, the 
philosopher of  science, Nancy Cartwright, again from a realist perspective, 
nonetheless argues for conditions of  applicability that are so stringent that she must 
seriously doubt the usefulness of econometrics.  In this paper, I reconsider Lawson's 
and Cartwright's analyses and argue that realism supports rather than undermines 
econometrics properly interpreted and executed. Econometrics and  Reality 
10 September 1997 
Econometrics and Reality 
Is econometrics possible?  The question reminds me of an argument between two 
divines at an ecumenical confkrence.  BAITIST  MMISTER:  "I don't believe in infant 
baptism."  ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP:  "Not only do I believe in infant baptism, I have 
seen it done." Every applied economist has seen it done; yet Tony Lawson in his recent 
book, Economics  andReality (l997),  assures us that, splash the econometric holy water 
as you may, economic heaven -will not be a whit closer. The metaphor is perfectly apt; 
for Lawson's reason for dismissing econometrics is metaphysical:  transcendental realism 
provides an accurate ontology of the economic world; econometrics is necessarily 
incompatible with transcendental realism.  Nancy Cartwright, who is also a realist, 
appears more favorably disposed to econometrics.  After all, in her Nature 5 Capacities 
and Their Measurement (1989), she stokes the self-esteem of economists by suggesting 
that quantum physicists might learn a thing or two about handling probabilities from 
econometricians. Beneath a cheery exterior, her views are in fact stunningly pessimistic: 
the conditions in which econometric methods can succeed are strict; they may be met in 
the land of quantum physics, but never in their country of origin.  Against both Lawson 
and Cartwright, I maintain that econometrics and realism are compatible and, indeed, that 
realism helps us better to understand the role and successes of econometrics. 
I.  Realism 
According to Uskali Malki (1996) ontologrcal realism is the doctrine that entities 
beyond the realm of the commonsense exist externally (i.e., independently of any 
individual human mind) and objectively (i.e.,  unconstituted by our representations of 
them).  Scientific realism is opposed to Humean empiricism (or as Lawson, following Econometrics and  Reality 
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Bhaskar, terms it "empirical realism").  Empiricism maintains that reality consists of 
"objects of experience constituting atomistic events" (Lawson 1997, p. 19).  For Hume, 
one billiard ball strikes another, and the other moves.  There is no more to the story than 
what our own minds supply.  Lawson (1997, part I) adopts the transcendental realism of 
Roy Bhaskar (1975).  Bhaskar (1975, ch.  I) proposes a stratified ontology of 
mechanisms, events, and experi~ences.  Experiences are people's direct (subjective) 
perceptions of events.  Events are the realizations of mechanisms.  And mechanisms are 
the underlying, not directly accessible structures whose complex interactions determine 
which events are actually reahed. It is the reality of such mechanisms, of their powers, 
dispositions, capacities, efficacy, anti necessary connections, that Humean empiricism 
denies (or, at least, denies us the the knowlledge of). 
Bhaskar offers a transcendental argument in favor of the reality of the stratum of 
mechanism and, hence, terms his metaphysics transcendental realism. Cartwright (1994, 
p. 279), like Bhaskar, develops a similar argument based on Kant's classic "puzzling" 
form.  Let X be features of the vvorldi we are loth to deny; let @be  an "abstruse 
philosophical position." The argument then runs: without @,  X would be inconceivable; 
hence X. Both Bhaskar and Ca~twri,ght  use Kant's transcendental argument to move fiom 
the accepted success of experimental sciences to the reality of a realm of powers, 
capacities, dispositions, or meclhanisms.  Cartwright, in fact, goes somewhat further, 
including in her X "the possibility of  planning, prediction, manipulation, control and 
policy setting." 
Transcendental realism gets started with the observation that regularities of the 
sort contemplated by Hume are: relatively hard to find and must be created Econometrics and Real~ty 
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experimentally, and experimen~ts  are manipulations that presuppose that the things 
manipulated act in reliable ways.  For Bhaskar, experiments are about making things 
happen in regular relationships that they do not normally show in the world.  This 
requires intervention and manipulation. To show that a feather and a stone fall from the 
same height in the same time, to exemplify Newton's law of gravity, requires 
experimental control -  removing the air from the space through which they fall.  For such 
an experimental procedure to make sense .the feather and the stone must have the 
disposition to fall according to a similar rule, but quite different dispositions to react to 
air resistance; the scientist must be able to reliably remove the air from the chamber in 
which they fall (i.e.,  the machine must be (disposed  to act as a vacuum pump and to 
respond to his initiation); and so forth.  A world of dispositions or powers is presupposed, 
a world in which such dispositions and po.wers mix in  varying ways, an open world in 
which a scientist may intervene to c:reate  closzrre to isolate and separate enduring 
capacities or dispositions that are not normally distinct Humean empirical regularities. 
Some closures may be spontaneous (the solar system, for example, which runs according 
to nearly Humean regularity without controls).  Most closures are the product of 
experimental intervention. 
The necessity of closure for the appearance of regularity is nearly tautological in 
Bhaskar's account:  closed systems are defined as "systems in which constant 
conjunctions occur" (Bhaskar  1 975. p. 33; cf. Lawson 1997, p. 19). 
Although Bhaskar in  711e Possibility of Naturalism (1  979) goes out of his way to 
defend the view that essentially the same analysis that he applies to physical sciences can 
also be applied to social sciences, L,awson denies that an analogous transcendental Econometrics and Reality 
10 September 1997 
argument can be applied directly to "mainstream" economics.  The argument cannot get 
started, Lawson (1997, p. 56) blelieves, because the social sciences do not have the 
demonstrated success needed as a premise of the transcendental argument.  With respect 
to "mainstream" economics, Lawson regards the lack of success simply to be a fact.  But 
that fact is partly explained by  :he  nature of social sciences generally., It is not usually 
possible to create experimental ,closures of social situations.  There are practical 
difficulties:  society is too complex and heterogeneous; there are legal and ethical 
barriers.  And there is human agency:  planets, atcms, and rocks do not make choices; 
people do. Lawson's strategy is not to start with the practice of economics, as Bhaskar 
started with the practice of natural sciences, but to use the insights of Bhaskar's ontology 
as the basis for a methodological reform of economics.  Transcendental realicm is 
transcribed into a new mode:  critical rea1i:i-m. Whereas for physical sciences, their 
success was an explanatory premise, for social sciences -  particularly for economics -  its 
failures are the explanandum 
Il.  What's Wrong with Econometrics 
Lawson:  The  Search for Cowrrrg  law^ and the Failure of Closure 
Lawson characterizes "m,ainstream'"  economics as engaged in a search for 
covering laws -  universal regularities that connect observable events 
"[E]conometricians concern themselves with attempting to determine constant event 
conjunctions .  .  . of a probabilistic sort" (Lawson 1997, p. 69).  Econometrics is an 
example of regularity stochasticism: 
for every (measurable) economic event or state of affairs y there exists a set of 
conditions or events, etc.,  XI, xz, . . . x,  say, such that y and XI, ~2,  . . . x,,  are 
regularly conjoined under some (set of) "well-behaved probabilistic 
formulation(s). In other wolrds, stochastic clositres are everywhere assumed to Econometrics and Realit? 
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hold; for any (measurable) economic event y a stable and recoverable 
relationship between a set of cc~nditions  xl, xz, . . . x,, and the average or expected 
value ofy (conditional upoln  xl,  12,  . . . x,)  or some such, is postulated. [Lawson 
1997, p. 761 
The axioms and assumptions of economic theory are similarly regarded as claims about 
constant conjunctions.  Theoretical explanation in economic theo~y  is based on 
deductions from covering laws, "constant conjunctions of the form 'whenever event x 
then event y
7," and initial or boundary conditions (Lawson 1997, p. 91).  The theorist 
subscribes to a "degenerate" form of'reguliirity stochasticism -  regulari~  determinism 
(Lawson 1997, p. 98). 
Lawson's argument against econometrics starts with claim that there are no laws 
in economics (Lawson 1997, p. 70).  The Lucas critique provides an explanation of this 
fact from within economics itself. '  Lucas (1 1976) argued that large-scale econometric 
models, and more generally, empirically estimated aggregate relationships are likely to be 
unstable because they reflect the: decisions made by  economic agents in particular policy 
environments and those policy environments change.  For example, the expectations- 
augmented Phillips curve, which rela.tes the unemployment rate to rate inflation would 
not remain stable if there were a change in  monetary policy.  Agents would integrate their 
knowledge of how policy was condu'cted into their expectations of hture policy 
outcomes (e.g.,  knowledge of the central bank's money supply rule into knowledge of the 
future path of the money supply), changing; the phenomenal relationship of 
unemployment to inflation with each, shift in  policy regime.  Lawson (1997, pp. 71-75) 
regards the Lucas critique as sound as  far as it goes.  But he stigmatizes responses such as 
The acclaim of the Lucas critique among e:conomsts  overshadows the fact that there is relatively little 
empirical support for its importance, which undercuts Lawson's thesis; see Ericsson and Irons (1995). Econometrics and Real~ty 
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Sargent's program of providing microfourtdationally based econometrics as unable to 
succeed because the Lucas critique is merely a symptom of a larger failure of 
macroeconomic systems to achiieve intrinsic or extrinsic closure. 
In physical sciences, regulari~ty  stochasticism fails when there is insuff~cient 
shielding to isolate a system From  conflating causes.  In  macroeconomics, regularity 
stochasticism fails for at least two additional reasons.  First, a microfoundational 
approach such as Sargent's fails because the technical conditions needed for aggregation 
of individual behavior to well-ordered relations among aggregates are not met (Lawson 
1997, pp. 80-9 1).  Second, an ec:onometric model can fulfill the conditions of regularity 
stochasticism only if it can limit the range of agent's behavior is definite conditions to 
"only one outcome or 'exit"' (Lawso8n  199'7, p. 79).  But this is a misrepresentation of the 
intrinsic openness of economic systems in which agents can genuinely choose and in 
which, therefore, their behavior cannot be governed by  a predictive law. 
Lawson's argument against econometrics stands or falls with his characterization 
of the discipline as principally c~oncerned  with establishing covering laws.  To establish 
this Lawson (1997) quotes on behalf of economic theory From Frank Hahn (e.g.,  p. 18) 
and on behalf of  econometrician.^ from David Hendry (p. 301).  Setting aside the (fairly 
serious) issue of whether these economists -  eminent as they are -  are actually 
representative of their subdisciplines, we nevertheless should heed D.H. Lawrence's 
dictum to trust the tale, not the teller.  When we examine the practice of economists, 
Lawson's characterization of the discipline: as searching for covering laws seems 
misconceived. Econometrics and Reality 
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The concerns that animated Lucas (1976) are old. He acknowledges some 
precursors, such as Tinbergen, and overlooks others, such as Haavelmo, but makes no 
claims for originality.  Reading the: early contributions to econometrics collected in 
Hendry and Morgan (1995) one cannot but be struck with the clearness with which early 
econometricians understood the difrtculties of isolating particular causal relationships 
fiom the dense webs of economic influences and of accounting for the ever changing 
institutions and background conditions. It is inconceivable that one could believe these 
econometricians to be, or that they could :have believed themselves to be, in search of 
covering laws, if by that one means in search of invariant event regularities that remain 
constant over time and against all c.hangin.g  background conditions.  Yes, they sought 
robust regularities, but they expecte:d neither the precision nor the freedom from context 
and contingency that is implied in Lawson's covering-law characterization. 
Nor has this changed recently. Sargent (e.g.,  Hansen and Sargent 1980) seeks to 
resolve the Lucas critique by actually modeling the processes of expectation formation 
(in Lawson's language to achiewe closure).  The intent (whether it is successfL1 is another 
question) is to rock-bottom tastes and technology, the so-called "deep parameters," utility 
hnctions (representing people's preferences), budget constraints, and production 
hnctions (presenting engineering relations). I have argued elsewhere (Hoover 1988, 
1992) that this program is not likely to succeed.  But the point now is just that these 
components do not look like covering laws.  A utility hnction is not an empirical 
relationship at the level of events.  It is more like a power or capacity; it is a description 
of the disposition of an agent to act, provided that a situation is constructed around him 
(that is the role of the budget constraint) that permits him to realize his disposition. Econometrics and Reality 
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Lucas (1987) and Kydland and Prescott ( 1991, 1996) are sceptical Sargent's program. 
They prefer to construct theoretical models that are "calibrated"  to yield empirical 
content, yet are not estimated econometrically (see Hoover 1995 and Hartley, Hoover and 
Salyer, 1997, 1998).  But this is an 11n-house  dispute with Sargent over realisticness (to 
use Maki's term) or idealizati~~l;  or deducibility. The conception of models as being built 
up out of components that are not covering laws but more like powers or capacities is 
shared by all the disputants.  Seen this way, Lucas and company are much closer to 
transcendental realism than to positivism.'' 
Nancy Cartwright:  The  Ddiculty of Constructing Closures 
Cartwright is more sym1patht:tic to "mainstream" economics, though her ontology 
is similar to Lawson's and Bhaskar's.  Cartwright (1983) maintained that the "laws of 
physics lie" in the sense that they ar~e  never instantiated without substantial human 
interference in the form of experimental controls and substantial interpretive license. 
More recently, Cartwright (1994, 1995,  MBL~)  has refined her objection to laws:  it is not 
so much that they lie, but that they a.re properties of highly particular organizations of 
things and are only known to be true within the limited domains in which we have 
instantiated them.  She stigmatizes the claims that laws are universal as "fimdamentalist" 
and describes her own views as "loc;al realism" (Cartwright 1994). This distinguishes her 
2 Lawson's central evidence for the claim (hat economic theory subscribes to the covering-law model is 
found in two quotations from Hahn (Lawson  1997, p. 92). These are a weak reed. One contrasts the 
"complex, institution and history dependent 'facts' of the econometrician" with deeper regularities. The 
other, claims that the axioms of theo~y  are not arbitrary but widely agreed characterizations  with empirical 
content. The first quotation could easily be read as consistent with transcendental realism, and the second 
falls far short of endorsing a covering-law account.  Rosenberg (1992, pp. 24-25) argues that economics has 
been less affected by  positivism than any other social science.  Hausman (1992) offers a non-positivist 
interpretation of microeconomic theory. 
'  "MBL" stands for "Models: The Bllueprints for ]Laws." undated typescript. Econometrics and Reality 
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somewhat from Lawson (1997, p. 2:3)  who believes that the actions of mechanisms are 
not subject to ceterisparibus conditions, but are universal, even though rarely observed 
acting in isolation. 
Like Bhaskar and Lawson, Clartwright believes that to observe a law directly is 
possible only in contrived circumstances -  e.g.,  in experiments shielded from outside 
interferences.  In such "set-ups,"' what empirical regularities result depend upon the 
interactions of the capacities of the c.omponents. A law of physics such as F = ma really 
describes such a capacity.  It operates for all forces (F),  masses (m), and accelerations (a) 
so long as those terms can be m~eaninghlly  applied.  It interacts with other such 
capacities and is not guaranteed to hold outside its local domain. 
Cartwright (MBL) calls the set-ups, the "highly structured arrangements" that 
generate reliable empirical regu:laritiles, notnological machines.  The solar system (an 
example also favored by Bhaskar and Lawson) is an  unusual naturally occurring 
nomological machine.  A more .typical example is a particular harmonic oscillator:  say, a 
spring and a weight.  A model, iin  Cartwright's account, is a blueprint for a nomological 
machine.  It tells us how to construct them out of parts with the necessary capacities.  To 
provide a model is at once to establish or to widen the domain for the underlying capacity 
and to provide a recipe for producing an empirical regularity.  The capacities of a 
d2z 
harmonic oscillator are described by  a formula:  A -  + Bz = 0 .  Models connect this 
d- 
formula to physical set-ups. Both the spring and weight and a coil and capacitor can be 
configured into analogous oscillators of different physical forms but conforming to the 
formula.  In the one case, A, B, and z  are interpreted as mass, distance, and force constant; Econometrics and Realitv 
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and, in  the other, as inductance.,  (inverse) capacitance, and charge.4 "[O]nce you call 
something a harmonic oscillator, then mec;hanics [or electronics] can get a grip on it .  .  ." 
(Cartwright MBL). 
The central message of .Nature 3 Capacities and neir  Measurement  (1  989) was 
that structural econometrics in the Cowles Commission tradition, the,estimation of 
identified  systems of causally interpretable equations, was possible only with strong 
(singular) causal assumptions.  Though she did not use this terminology then, the central 
claim can be put in other words:  to measure causal probabilities in an econometric 
system, the nomological machine must be completely articulated.  Cartwright's interest in 
econometrics in Nature 's Capacities was instrumental. She looked to it for a logical or 
methodological lesson for quantum physics.  For that purpose it did not matter whether 
econometrics was actually successfL~l  in  its; own domain. 
Cartwright (MBL)  illust.rates the kind of specific causal knowledge needed "to get 
causes from probabilities" with a schematic design (a "blueprint") for a machine that 
delivers a particular set of stochastic regularities, ones in which a true cause lowers the 
conditional probability of the effect. The (details  of the machine, originally designed by 
Towfic Shomar, are not important, except to note that they are quite specific and as 
straightforwardly instantiated a.s the: recipe for PfefSerniisse in  The Joy of  Cookmg. 
Instead of pepper, molasses, flour and butter, Shamor uses chambers, a source of alpha 
particles, a proton, and magnetic fields.  To understand or to explain the probabilistic 
behavior of the proton in  Sharr~or's  machine is, according to Cartwright, to be able to 
model the nomological machine an'd to measure the relevant probabilities.  This synthetic 
'  See, for example. Halliday and Resnick ((1962,  pp. 855-856) which spells out the formal analogy in detail 
10 Econometrics and Reality 
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understanding is not, however, all that there is to understanding  The probabilistic 
behavior of Shamor's machine is driven 1Sy  a radioactive source with well-behaved 
probabilities of emission of alpha particles  My understanding is that, while quantum 
mechanics provides some furtiher synthetic explanation analogous to that provided by 
Shamor's machine, we need not go too far down before we reach Hume's rock-bottom in 
which we cannot say why, but merely that, a regularity occurs  This too is knowledge. 
The story of Shamor's machine reinforces the theme begun in Nature's 
Capacitres. regular probabilistic behavior is a property that is assured only in tightly 
controlled set-ups  Only if one were to repeat Shamor's set-up with considerable 
precision could one expect Shamor's probabilistitic relations to recur  Haavelmo's 
(1943) well known example of'the regular relationship between throttle setting and the 
speed of a car is similar  The relationship can be reproduced only with the same make of 
car in  very similar circumstances (air temperature, humidity, road surface, and so forth) 
Cartwright (BML) provides an example of a nomological machine in  economics in the 
guise of Pissarides's (1992) model of the persistence of unemployment  We shall 
consider Pissarides's model presently  In the meantlme the important point is that 
Cartwright shows that, to pin down probabilities for observables in the model, things 
"must be engineered just so " She proceeds (BML, Table 3) to list sixteen particular 
assumptions needed to make the model deliver its results 
Despite offering the examplle of a nomological machine in economics, 
Cartwright's pessimism about econometrics is implicit in the example  The assumptions 
of the Pissarides's model are tloo piuticular and too implausible to be hlfilled, so that, 
while econometrics seems possible in principle, it is hard to imagine how it could Econometrics and Reality 
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possibly succeed practically. Once the image of nomological machines is firmly rooted, 
it is hard to imagine them in  the economy, and yet harder to imagine that two economies 
might possess nomological machines of the same make and model.  In a public lecture, 
Cartwright (UIIL') was able to illicit gales; of laughter from the audience (largely of 
philosophers) simply by  descriking (with hardly a raised eyebrow and certainly no smirk) 
economists trying to determine the effect of educational expenditure on living standards 
in  Sri Lanka by treating Sri Lanka and other countries as draws fiom a stable regular 
association common to them all6 If there isre nomological machines in economics, that 
surely is not one. 
Anand and Kanbur (1995, p. 321) e:xposit a number of related studies with 
the following model [in which] :some measure of living standard, H,[,  for country 
i and time t: 
where y, is per capita income;  El,  is social welfare expenditure; a, is a time- 
specific but country-invariant effect assumed to reflect technological advances 
(e.g.  disease eradication techniques);  ,I,  is a country-specific and time-invariant 
'fixed effect';  6 is the marginal impact of social expenditure on living 
standards; and  u;, is a random error term. 
The object of these studies is to measure S or, at least, to better understand the 
relationship between E and H.  I[  am too ignorant of this literature to pass any judgement 
upon it in economic or econometric terms. The important point here is that it is 
characteristic of large areas of empirical ec;onomics; so, if Cartwright can dismiss these 
"WVL " stands for "Where Do Laws of Nature Come From?." a lecture by Nancy Cartwright in the 
Phrlosophy Department of the Univer:sity  of California, Davis.  References are all to my personal notes of 
the lecture. 
6 My notes leave me in considerable dloubt  whether I have identrfied the particular study that Cartwr~ght 
had in  mind.  My best guess is Anand and Kanbur (1995), which surveys and criticizes cross-counw 
studies of the relationship of social welfare expenditure to standards of living and offers an alternative 
analysis of Sri Lankan time-series data. Econometrics and Realit). 
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studies on the basis of a prior understanding of the requirements of local realism, that is a 
pessimistic conclusion indeed. 
III.  The Possibility of Econometrics 
The Second Transcendental Argmrtent 
Cartwright's pessimistilc conclusion is not, I think, an implication of her realism; 
it is hardly compatible with it. Cartwright argues for the realism of mechanisms and their 
component capacities fiom the essential role they play in  making the practice of 
experimentation possible.  While Cartwright correctly stresses the stringent conditions 
often necessary to establish stable regularities in an experimental context, perhaps too 
much of her focus is on the mechan~isms  that those regularities instantiate.  Bhaskar's and 
Lawson's (1997, p. 25) argument for a world of structured, intransitive objects 
emphasizes the same point.  Ye:t Ca~rtwright  draws a second conclusion fiom the success 
of experimentation.  Experiments must be structured and shielded.  To engineer and 
construct them, we must be ablle to controll and manipulate things and environments.  In 
so doing, we rely on prior knovvledge, some of which is no doubt theoretically warranted 
and precise, but much of which corrlprises imprecise facts of whose domain we have only 
limited knowledge.  The transcendental argument is straightforward:  "If I do not know 
these things, what do I know and how can I come to know anything?" (Cartwright 1994, 
p. 280). 
Bhaskar and Lawson conclude that the world must be "open" if experiments are 
to make sense. The second trar~scen~dental  argument establishes that there also must be a 
usefil  number of reliable and rnanilpulabl~e  pre-theoretical regularities if scientists are to 
be able to create closures in an open world.  Lawson (1997, p. 27) writes: "outside of Econometrics and Reality 
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astronomy at least, most of the constant-event conjunctions which are held to be 
significant in science, in fact ocxur only under the restricted conditions of experimental 
control." That could only be tnue if "cons1:ant conjunction" means exceptionless 
conjunction on a universal domain.  True, the path of a falling leaf (Lawson's example) 
or of a $1000 bill blowing through St. Stephen's Square (Neurath's example cited by 
Cartwright (1994, p. 283)) is ha.rd to1  predict. Still, though we know exceptions, the 
general rule "if I drop it, it falls"' is reliable: and essential to our making our way through 
the world.  A coin dropped from an upper story window exemplifies that regularity, while 
the coin that returns to one's hand after being cast over the cliff at Blowing Rock, North 
Carolina is the exception that proves; the nrle.  We adapt our expectations for the coin to 
the altered circumstances fairly easily.  Nor is it just a matter of some regularities being 
overwhelmed with exceptions, while others have fewer.  Some regularities might be 
perfectly exceptionless but imprecise.  An iron ball dropped from Carfax tower will land 
in Oxford city center; a balsa wood glider in  Oxfordshire; a helium ballon on Earth. 
Openness is relative.  Uncontrolled., non-experimental situations, not just in 
astronomy, may be closed enough to deliver regularities of varying degrees of precision 
and reliability.  Conversely, no experiment is perfectly immune to outside influences. 
Closure too is relative.  And, in large measure, closure is secured using regularities 
readily to hand in the world as instn~ments. 
The Success of Economics 
There are social regularities as we'll. These are not all the result of laws or 
institutional restrictions or conventions, although people are seldom found outside such 
contexts.  That I can predict the route my  daughter will take home from school, even Econometrics and Reality 
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though there are many possible routes, ac:curately enough to meet her mid-way, even 
though we had no prior coordination, is based on a social (or at least human) regularity. 
It does not call her agency into question; she genuinely chooses her own route home. 
Making our way in the world requires us to exploit many social regularities:  traffic is 
heavy from 4 to 6 PM; a store manager will tolerate verbal aggression up to a point; a 
punk on the streets will tolerate much less verbal aggression; money will purchase goods; 
people will understand me when I talk.  These examples are "micro" (except perhaps the 
traffic example).  Yet, reliable social regularities may also be "macro" or at least 
aggregate: electricity usage in California is higher in January and August than in April or 
October; the crime rate is higher when the proportion of men 16-24 years old to the 
whole population is higher.  Again, the reliability of such regularities is no threat to 
agency.  I must decide when to turn my  air conditioner on; I have a choice.  Pacific Gas 
and Electric Company would have ii difficult time modeling my individual choice in a 
precise way, yet it may be able to predict its aggregate load rather accurately. 
Lawson overstates the failures of econometrics -  or at least of empirical 
 economic^.^  As  in  physical sciences, what are in  practice referred to as "laws;' are a 
hodge-podge of summary statements of differing epistemological status. Some are 
axioms, some analytical truths., some heuristic rules; but some are also empirical 
generalizations.  Although one can posit models in  which they are deductive 
'  It is unclear how Lawson would distinguish the two.  He says (1997, p. 69) that he does not question the 
use of means, growth rates, or other sumn~w  statistics which are legitimate where feasible.  A substantial 
part of my argument below is that much of econometrics is in fact more sophisticated versions of these 
"legitimate" activities and investigation into the conditions of their "feasibility."  One strategy open to 
Lawson would be to define econometrics as the search for constant conjunctions so that it necessarily fails 
if there are no such constant conjunctions, but thls would do little justice to the reality of econometrics as it 
is practiced. Econometrics and Reality 
10 September 1997 
consequences, the law of demand, Engel's law, Okun's law, Gresham's law are, first and 
foremost, robust empirical generalizations. They are like the regularity of the balsa wood 
glider thrown from Carfax Tovver landing in Oxfordshire:  robust because imprecise. 
Lawson (1997, p. 70 and fn. 3, p. 301) cites the well-documented inaccuracies of 
economic forecasts.  But econc;netrically-based forecasts, however, inaccurate are better 
than non-econometric forecasts.  And, what is more, there is a difference between a 
relationship holding in different times, the sense of robustness that is analogous to 
constant conjunction, and a relationship being useful to connect the present to the future, 
as in an unconditional forecast.  The theory of efficient markets predicts (in the sense of 
asserting the robust relationshi]:, to hold in different times and places) that the price of 
publicly traded shares is unpredictable (in the sense of tomorrow's value being 
foreseeable today).  Robust, but imprecise:, relationships are routinely made more locally 
precise.  This is what Pacific, Gas and E1e:ctric does when it estimates electricity demand 
on the basis of temperature, time of' day, price, and other variables.  The relationships are 
well known qualitatively, but its business decisions require more quantitatively precise 
information.  They do not regard it as a threat to those decisions if the precise relationship 
they estimate for California in 1997 is n0.t the same as for California in 1957 or for 
Holland in 1997.  Academic economists too easily forget that business and government 
empioys large numbers of their peers in part because of the practical and monetary value 
that they correctly assign to their quantitative conclusions (also see Hoover 1995). 
The Role of Experiments 
If Lawson exaggerates the  failure:^ of empirical economics, Cartwright Econometrics and Reality 
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exaggerates the centrality of experirnents.  Cartwright takes an engineer's view:  the 
problem is how to construct nomological machines or experiments.  Her focus is on a 
certain sort of knowledge.  Other sorts of knowledge should not be neglected.  There are 
observational sciences as well as experimental or analytical sciences.  The balance 
between observation and analysis corresponds roughly to the ease of experimentation. 
There is a growing field of experimental economics; nevertheless, economics is more like 
meteorology, vulcanology, or epidemiology than it is like physics or chemistry.  The 
problem in these sciences is less how to construct nomological machines than how to 
infer what nomological machines in fact operate (i.e.,  what the principles of their 
operation (their capacities) are) on the basis of feasible observations. 
The difference is illustrated by an exercise set to some college electronics classes. 
One learns the natures or powers of electronic components by learning Ohm's law, 
Kirchoff s law, and so forth, and by  learning the ways in  which particular resistors, 
capacitors, transistors, and other components exemplify these natures or powers (that is, 
one learns their capacities). This knowledge permits the student to construct radios, 
oscillators, and other nomological machines.  In the exercise, the situation is flipped 
around.  A particular circuit is embedded in epoxy, so that only its various terminii are 
exposed.  Using measuring instruments, the student must infer the structure of the 
internal circuit.  The student is aided by  the fact that he has a pretty good idea of the 
menu of capacities:  he knows Ohm's law and how particular resistors might embody it. 
It would be a harder case, if he had to both infer the structure and characterize the 
capacities simultaneously. Econometrics and Reality 
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Economics presents us with this harder case.  To be sure, John Stuart Mill and 
Austrian economists generally have argued that economics is a compositive discipline in 
which components with well-understood capacities are combined (see Hausman 1992). 
One might see the elements of ~~eocllassical  heuristics, such as utility fbnctions and budget 
constraints, as the analogues of re~is~tors  and capacitors.  Unfortunately, their capacities 
are generic, unlike the capacity of, say, u~~~  to emit alpha particles, suitable only for 
rough sketches of nomological imachines - not for blueprints. 
N.  An Illustrative Case 
Pissarides S Machine 
Econometrics is possible and compatible with realism because the argument for 
realism implies the existence of robu,st regularities. Econometrics aims to characterize 
those regularities.  It seems to be an  impos:sible discipline only when we either think of it 
as aiming to quantify covering 1,aws or to characterize directly the performance of 
nomological machines.  The issues can be illustrated with Cartwright's (MBL) example 
of a nomological machine in  economics: P'issarides's (1992) model of the persistence of 
unemployment. 
Cartwright (BML) makes the same point about Pissarides's model as she does 
about Shamor's proton machine: "it takes hyperfine-tuning .  .  . to get a probability." In 
the case of Shamor's machine, this h;yperfine-tuning  took the form of choosing a 
radioactive source with just the right. rate of emission of alpha particles, an electric field 
of just the right strength, and so fortlh.  In the case of Pissarides's  model, the hyper-fine 
tuning takes the form of assuming that people are identical, live exactly two periods, are 
equal in number in each generation, engage in Nash wage bargains with their employers, Econometrics and Reality 
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have matching probabilities that can be described according to rather precise formulae, 
and so forth.  It is striking that, whik Shannor's machine could be built according to his 
blueprint, I would not know where to begi:n to build a real-world version of Pissarides's 
machine.  Shamor's design is a recipe for ~"fefserniisse;  Pissarides's is a recipe using salt 
with spherical crystals, unsweet sugiir, and the spice of the fairy bush;  I can build 
Pissarides's machine, but only als a computer simulation, not in an actual economy. The 
probabilities of Shamor's machine are rooted in the fact that the radioactive source really 
does emit alpha particles randornly vvith known probability; the probabilities of 
Pissarides's machine are deductions from axiomatic assumptions about the probabilities 
ofjob match.  If the economy were the way that Pissarides describes it, then these 
deduced probabilities would be observed.  But it is not really that way. 
The point is not that Pissarides's mlodel is wrong or useless, but merely that it 
stands in a different relationship to tlhe world than Shamor's model.  It is, perhaps, a toy, 
bearing the same relationship to1  the economy as a model airplane does to a Boeing 747. 
Toys have their uses -  even scientifically.  In the movie of Planet of  the Apes, the 
intelligent apes deride the astromauts' claim to have flown to their planet, on the grounds 
that flight is impossible.  A paper airplane, quickly folded and flown the length of the 
room, provides an eloquent refi~tation.  At best, Pissarides's model is an idealization.  As 
such it raises subtle questions about the relationship of idealizations to real-world data 
that interest not only methodologists and philosophers, but which form the heart of 
serious practical disputes am0n.g  economists, as the case of the contrasting reactions to 
the Lucas critique of Sargent, on the one hand, and Lucas, Kydland and Prescott, on the 
other (Section I1 above; cf. Hoover 1994, 1995). Econometrics and Reality 
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It is instructive to examine Pissarides's (1992, Section V) own discussion of the 
empirical implications of his model.  He considers an empirical model of two equatiow8 
(31)  v = F(4 w,  S, d) 
and 
(32)  q = G(v,  s,  c, 4, 
where v is the measure of vacant jobs, 4 and w "are the usual variables that influence the 
demand for labor in frictionless models" (p. 1387), s is the number of job seekers, d is the 
duration structure of unemployment, c, is the intensity of search, and ais  a measure of 
mismatch or sectoral shifts. 
How do these equations map onto Pissarides's theoretical model?  Equation (3 1) 
is supposed to correspond to equation (7) in the theoretical model: 
(17)  Jt  =Lk[l +y+(l  -y)qr.l]qt, 
where J is the number of jobs, A!.  is the nurnber of workers in each generations, k is the 
inverse of the cost of opening a. job for one period, y is a productivity parameter, q is the 
probability of a match between a job seeker and a job opening, and subscripts indicate the 
relevant time.  Roughly v in equation (3  1) corresponds to J  in equation (7).  4 and w  are 
parameters is the theoretical mlodel(4 = 2 and w = 1) and so do not show up explicitly.  d 
is a summary measure reflecting the time dependence induced by the interaction of the 
two matching probabilities at different dates, q,~  and qr. 
Equation (32) is supposed to correspond to equation (8) (p. 1377): 
(8)  ql = min{x(J,/2L, 1 ),  1 ), 
- 
8 Equations numbers refer are reproduced from the original 
2  0 Econometrics and Reality 
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where x(. , .) is a twice-differentiable hn~ction  with positive first-order and negative 
second-order derviatives, homogeneous of degree 1 and satisfiing 
(2)  x(0, 2L) = x(,J,,  0)  == 0 
and 
(3)  ~(4,  2L) 5 max{Jr, 2L). 
Again, v in equation (32)  corresponds to J in equation (8)  and s  to L. c "is implicit in" 
(19)  Sr  = qr  [I +y  + qLll  (1 -y)]L. 
"[Slectoral shifts [aj were ignored in the theoretical discussion." 
The point of recounting, these details of Pissarides's model is to show just how 
rough the correspondence is betwee:n his theoretical model, with its painstaking details 
needed to achieve closure and to deliver probabilities, and the schematic empirical model 
of equations (3  1) and (32). The variables are vaguely defined and not perfectly 
analogous.  What data do they represent?  The hnctional forms are left general.  To 
estimate equations (3  1) and (3;!),  these forms would have to be made concrete, most 
likely linear or log-linear, thou,gh, in any case, they could not be direct transcriptions of 
equations (7) and (8),  since they include variables omitted in the theoretical model.  At 
best, Pissarides's model is suggestive of the qurlitative relationships one might look for 
in the data.  Unlike Shamor's proton machine, the hyper-fine details of Pissarides's 
model do virtually no work in  helping us to create a chance set-up. They are not the 
elements of the blueprints for a nornological machine. 
If we admit that Pissarides's model is not a blueprint of a nomological machine, 
does that mean that the idea of a nomological machine can do no work in econometrics? 
Not at all.  Another feature omitted, from equations (3  1) and (32)  are the error terms Econometrics and Reality 
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always tacked onto econometrically estimated equations to reflect factors of which we are 
ignorant or have ignored.  Let's add them: 
(3  1')  v = F(4 w,  s,  d)  + 1; 
(:32')  q = G(v,  s, c, 4 + 1iZ 
It is a necessary, though not suf'ficient, condition for the econometric model connecting 
two variables to have accurately recapitulated the probabilistic relationship generated by 
the underlying mechanism that the emor te:rms, E and y  be random and uncorrelated 
with each other.  If, say, we choose particular hnctional forms for equations (3 1 ') and 
(32') and the errors are not random, then we know that the estimated equations do not 
belong to the class of possible recapitulations.  Econometricians worry about 
specification, appealing to entirely statistical criteria, precisely because they worry about 
a mismatch between what they estimate and what the unknown mechanism must have 
generated.  The nomological m,achine  is a regulatory ideal.  We do not necessarily need a 
blueprint, though we do need to und~erstand  the implication of a machine being there in 
reality. 
Pissarides (1992, p. 1390) p;articularly  concerns himself with the possibility - 
suggested not by his theoretical model, but by general considerations -  that din  equation 
(3  1') might be a hnction of q in equation (32').  The two equations would then be 
simultaneous, the error terms correlated; and the estimate of the marginal effect of d on v, 
which is his primary interest, svould be biased.  He considers the problem of finding 
instruments that would permit him to obtiain unbiased estimates.  The criterion on which 
he judges most instruments to be u:nsuitable is statistical -  the fact that they are not Econometrics and Reality 
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correlated with d and/or are correlated with v.  Such instruments are the genuine 
equivalents of shielding in experiments.  Their utility is found not with respect to the 
probability structure that Pissarideis's assumptions guarantee for his theoretical model, 
but with respect to the probab:ility structure of the error terms, which are not mentioned in 
his model at all.  The important probabilities are not the ones that find their source in the 
analogue to Shamor's source of alpha radiation, but ones that reflect the fact the 
estimated system is carved out of a more complex system.  The idea of the nomological 
machine has a heuristic role even when we lack a recipe. 
The theoretical model iis  not a blu~eprint;  it is interpretive and in economics there 
is usually a gap in precision between the interpretation (often only qualitative) and the 
estimated regularity.  This is not a mecessity.  It is not that a nomological machine could 
not exist, though Pissarides's rnode:l is not a blueprint for one.  Fortunately, the 
possibility and usehlness of econometrics does not depend on it being one. 
A Bit of Old-fashioned and Primil'ive Econometrics 
Pissarides (1992, p. 1390) mentions that an implication of his analysis is that a 
plot of the unemployment and the vacancy rate should make counterclockwise loops over 
the business cycle, the overall relationship (the Beveridge Curve) between them being 
inverse.  Furthermore, he states that such loops are observed.  I did not know that. Is it 
true?  A little investigation into this question will provide a concrete example that may 
illustrate some of the points about econometrics and realism that I have made more 
abstractly already. 
Vacancy data is better for the U.K.  than the U.S.,  but having easiest access to U.S. 
data I plotted a measure of help-w8anted  advertisements in newspapers against the Econometrics and Reality 
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unemployment rate for the U.S.,  quarterly from 195 1 (earliest available data) through 
1986, retaining ten years of observa~tions  for checking stability.9 Figure 1 presents the 
scatterplot with a regression line.  The data seem to indicate the relationship is not inverse 
as expected but direct.  These data certainly do not look like data from a well-defined 
chance set-up.  In Figure 2, I cmnect the data points in chronological,  sequence.  They are 
not random.  They show two patternis:  loops, indicative of serial correlation; and a drift 
up and to the right, indicative of nonstatiomarity.  Figure 3 plots the two time series 
against the business cycle.  Vacancies reach a high and unemployment a low near the 
peak of each business cycle.  The extreme points drift higher with each cycle.'0 Figure 4 
plots data transformed by subtracting the value at the previous cyclical peak from each 
series eliminating the drift.  Figure 5 is the scatterplot of this data with a fitted regression 
line, which is now clearly inverse.  The data is clearly still serially correlated, though the 
loops are now difficult to see since they are all centered on the regression line.  Is it 
stable?  Figure 7 plots the data from 195 1 to 1996.  A formal test of stability rejects the 
constancy of the regression coefficients.  Nevertheless, comparison of Figures 5 and 6 
suggest that, as a coarse, economic rlegularity, the relationship is robust.  The regression 
slopes are not very different andl  there is no dramatic change in the scatter of the points. 
Elimination of the trends from the two series and their positive long-run associations 
clearly reveals an inverse relationship, but does not eliminate the serial correlation -  the 
loops remain.  Figure 7 plots a representative loop, from the 1983 to 1990 business cycle 
Data for vacancies are "Index of Help-wanted adiiertising in newspapers (1967=100)." series LHEL; for 
unemployment "unemployment rate, total civilian labor force," series LHUR.  Both series are from the 
DRI Basic Economics:  hfacroecononrrc Database.  McGraw-Hill publisher, September 1996 edition. 
10 Formally, neither series can reject tlhe hypothesis of a unit root on standard tests. Econometrics and Reality 
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(peak to peak) in which the co~unterclockwise  pattern is evident.  The relationship appears 
to be stable. 
This exercise is econometrics of a very primitive sort.  It actually exemplifies 
pretty well the sort of econome:trics that was done in  the period before electronic 
computers (see Hendry and Morgan 1995, Morgan 1989, Klein 1996). It differs in detail, 
not in spirit, fiom the econometrics discussed in Pissarides's article and much of the 
econometrics currently practiced.  11t  illustrates a number of points with respect to this 
paper. 
We have uncovered three robust facts:  1. unemployment and vacancies trend 
together in the long run; 2. they are inversely related for any business cycle; 3. their 
relationship is nonlinear (the loops).  These facts are robust, but they are imprecise.  It is 
clear from comparing Figure 1 and Figure 6 that Lawson and Cartwright are perfectly 
right that what we observe are complex products of deeper interactions.  The superficial 
conjunctions of data, if they show any pattern at all, may be profoundly misleading.  To 
discover what the enduring rela.tionships are requires interventions or, at least, accounting 
for conflating factors, as we dici in controlling for the trend in going from Figure 2 to 
Figure 5. The control here was of a rather unspecific kind, unlike the hyper-fine 
assumptions of the nomological machine.  We set aside the trend movements without 
shedding any light on what factors govern the trend. We were governed by an economic 
intuition that economic relations are more likely to be stable within a business cycle than 
fiom one cycle to another.  There were ncl  guarantees.  It worked; but it might not have. 
We have not found a covering law or directly exhibited the capacity of a 
nomological machine.  On general economic grounds, it is more likely that the Econometrics and Reality 
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relationship between unemploymenlt and vacancies is the result of a common cause than 
that one causes the other directly." Yet, it may nevertheless be useful to know this non- 
causal correlation. It is probably not a bad guide to newspaper managers of the demand 
for advertisements conditional on folrecasts of the unemployment rate. 
Despite the ambitions and rhetoric of the Cowles Commission, econometrics is 
rarely about the measurement of completely articulated causal systems. It  is about 
observation (cf Hoover 1994).  As such there is no conflict with realism.  What is 
observed is the consequence of the underlying (Lawson's intransitive) reality. 
Observations invite explanation.  Even if a fact, such as the relationship of 
unemployment to vacancies, were to vanish (say, for the reasons highlighted in the Lucas 
critique), its having been so now stands in need of explanation. 
V. To End Optimistically 
I am more optimistic about tlhe pro:spects  for econometrics than either Lawson or 
Cartwright.  I cannot agree with Lavvson that realism implies the impossibility of 
econometrics.  Econometrics is not about measuring covering laws.  It is about observing 
unobvious regularities.  The existence of such regularities, at least locally, is a 
requirement of realism. 
Nor can I agree with the message implicit in Cartwright's work that the conditions 
11 Unlike the equations that usually represent them, regressions are duected. In a causal context. one would 
treat the independent variables as causes of  the dependent variable.  If  I am right, that unemployment and 
vacancies are correlated because of  a common causes. then there is no reason to prefer the regression of 
vacancies on unemployment. which is the regresslion line in the diagrams to one of  unemployment on 
vacancies.  The former minimizes the variance of  the error measured as deviations between the regression 
line and observed vacancies, the latter as deviations between the regression line and observed 
unemployment.  The fitted curves have different slopes, although they are qualitatively similar. Econometrics and Reality 
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under which econometrics could succeed are too demanding to be met.  The goal of 
econonometrics is not to serve as a nomological machine nor as its blueprint, but to 
discov5r facts that are generated by unobservable nornological machines, facts that 
theoretical models explain by providing rough drawings, if not blueprints.  The situation 
is like the British code-breakers during World War 11.  There were intercepted messages 
(data); patterns were discovered in the messages (econometrics); a design for a machine 
that could generate such patterns, starting first with a general conceptualizations (an 
idealized theoretical model) and ending with a working model (a goal which for many 
practical and, perhaps, metaphysical reasons may be beyond economics). 
The robustness of econometric facts is an argument for the existence of 
nornological machines, but the tools for discovering those facts do not presuppose (hlly 
articulated) knowledge of the construction of those machines.  The existence of robust 
facts is always contingent. Consider the attempts described in Anand and Kanbur (1995) 
to determine the effect of social expenditure on economic welfare in Sri Lanka.  There 
may be good economic reasons to doubt that this can be measured accurately by situating 
Sri Lanka in a cross-country study that presupposes that each country in the study is the 
outcome of a common process.  Anand and Kanbur implicitly reason that, if there is 
enough commonality of structure between the countries in the study (if the data are 
examples of the successful ope!ration  of a nomological machine), then the data will have 
certain econometrically observable features.  When that proves not to be the case, they 
conclude that the cross-sectional investigation is fruitless and move on to a time-series 
study of Sri Lanka alone.  Realistic metaphysics could not have told us a priori that they 
were right to do so. Econometrics and Reality 
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References 
Anand, Sudhir and S. M. Ravi Kanbur. (1'395) "Public Policy and Basic Needs Provision: 
Intervention and Achievemeint in Sri Lanka," in Jean Dreze, Amartya Sen, and Athar 
Hussain (eds.) The Political Economy ofHunger. Oxford:  Clarendon Press. 
Bhaskar, Roy. (1975) A Realist Theory of Science. Leeds:  Leeds Books. 
Bhaskar, Roy. (1  979) The Poss,ibili[y  of hhturalism A Philosophical Critique of the 
Contemporary Human Sciewes.  Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press 
Cartwright, Nancy. (1  983)  How the Laws of Physics Lie.  Oxford:  Clarendon Press 
Cartwright, Nancy. (1  989) Nature 's  Capacities and Their Measurement.  Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Cartwright, Nancy. (1994) "Fundamentalism vs. The Patchwork of Laws," Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, 2'79-292. 
Cartwright, Nancy. "Where Do Laws of Nature Come From?"  public lecture, 
Philosophy Department, University of California, Davis, 10 April 1997. 
Cartwright, Nancy. (undated). "Models:  The Blueprints for Laws," typescript 
Ericsson, Neil and John Irons. (1995) "The Lucas Critique in Practice:  Theory Without 
Measurement," in Kevin D. Hoover (ed ) M~~croeco:mnetrics:  Developr~~ents, 
Tensions, and Prospects. Dordrecht  :  Kluwer, pp. 263-3 12. 
Haavelmo, Trgyve. (  1944) "The: Probabilit:~  Approach in Econometrics," Econornetrica 
12 (supplement), July. 
Haliday, David and Robert Resrlick (1  962) Physics for Students of Science and 
Engineering, combined edition (part I first edition, part I1 second edition).  New York: 
Wiley. 
Hansen, Lars-Peter and Thomas J. Sargent (1980) "Formulating and Estimating Dynamic 
Linear Rational Expectations Models," .Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 
2(1), 7-46. 
Hausman, D.M. ( 1992)  The Inexact arid Separate Science of Economics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hendry, David F. and Mary Morgan. (1995) (eds.) The Foundations of Econometric 
Analysis.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hoover, Kevin D. ( 1988) The New  Classical Macroeconomics: A Sceptical Inquiry 
Oxford:  Blackwell. 
Hoover, Kevin D. ( 1992) "The :Rational Expectations Revolution:  An Assessment," 
Coto Journal, 12(1), 8  1-96. 
Hoover, K.D. (1994)  "Six Queries About Idealization in an Empirical Context,"  Poznan 
Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciencc?~  and the Humanities, Vol. 38, pp. 43-53. 
Hoover, Kevin D. (1994) "Econometrics as Observation:  The Lucas Critique and the 
Nature of Econometric Inference," Journal of Economic Methodology 1(1), 65-80. Econometrics and Reality 
10 September 1997 
Hoover, Kevin D. (1995) "Facts and  Artifacts:  Calibration and the Empirical Assessment 
of Real-Business-Cycle  Models," OxfordEconomic Papers, 47(1), 24--44. 
Hoover, Kevin D. (1995) "Why Does Methodology Matter for Economics?" Economrc 
Journal 1 O5(43O), 7 15-734. 
Klein, Judy L. (1997) Statisticad Visions in Time:  A History of Time Series Analysis, 
1662-1938. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward (1.  Prescott. (1991) "The Econometrics of the General 
Equilibrium Approach to Bu~siness  Cycles,"  Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
93(2), 161--78. 
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott. (1 996) "The Computational Experiment:  An 
Econometric Tool," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1), 69--86. 
Lawson, Tony. (1  997) E'conomi;cs  and Recrli@. London:  Routledge 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. "Econometric Policy Evaluation:  A Critique"  in Karl Brunner and 
Allan H. Meltzer (eds.) The Phillips Cuwe and Labor Markets.  Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, Voll. 1.  Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976. 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. Models of Business Cycles.  Oxford:  Blackwell, 1987. 
Maki, Uskali. (1989) "On the Proble:m of Realism in Economics," Ricerche Economiche 
43(1-2), 176-198 
Maki, Uskali. (1996) "Scientific Realism and Some Peculiarities of Economics," in R.S. 
Cohen, R. Hilpinen and Qiu Renitong (eds.)  Realism and Anti-realism in the 
Philosophy of Science.  Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 427-447. 
Morgan, Mary. ( 1989) The History of Econometric Analysis.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Pissarides, Christopher A. (1992) "L,oss of Skills During Unemployment and the 
Persistence of Employment Shocks," Quarterly Joztrnal of LCconomics  106(4), 13 7 1- 
1392. 
Rosenberg, A. ( 1 992). Econon;rics: Mathemcrtical Politics or Science of Diminishing 
Returns?  Chicago and London:  Chica,go University Press. Figure 1.  Vacancies and Unemployment 1951-86 
Unemployment (percent) Figure 3. Vacancies and Unemployment 1951-86 
--- 
Shaded areas Figure 4.  Vacancies and Unemployment 1951-86 
Shiaded areas 
indicate re~ess~ions. Figure 5.  Vacancies and Unemployment 1951  -86 
Unemployment adjusted for drift (percent) Figure 6.  Vacancies and Unemployment 1951-96 
-4  -2  0  2  4  6 
Unemplovment adiusted for drift (percent) Figure 7.  Vacancies and Unemployment 
over a Business Cycle (peak to peak) 
l982:4 
(trough) 
Unemployment adjusted for drift (percent) 